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ABSTRACT: Donaldson Brown developed the expanded Return on 
Investment (ROI) measure, or DuPont formula, in l914. However ROI 
was not Brown’s only contribution to financial management. His deal-
er ten-day reporting system was widely and rapidly adopted through-
out the auto industry. His ideas to support a variety of forecasting and 
planning techniques supported decentralized corporate management 
and his pricing processes were cutting-edge developments that oth-
ers tried to emulate. Flexible budgeting at General Motors, frequently 
unrecognized, also was in place during his financial administration in 
the early l920s.
ROI remains Brown’s most prominent contribution and the technique 
achieved status as a dominant approach to financial management 
in industrial corporations by the l950s. As a national standard-of-
performance measure, it was supported by varying sources including 
the American Management Association as well as in the teaching 
materials of academics, especially Robert N. Anthony of the Harvard 
Business School. The impact of these forms of dissemination led to 
ROI being adopted eventually at the Ford Motor Company when its 
previously autocratic centralized style of Ford family management 
was replaced by a team known as the Whiz Kids, led by Harvard 
Business School alumnus Robert McNamara and a former GM vice 
president, Earnest Breech. This paper asserts the significance of the 
innovations developed by Brown as being among the most important 
of those initiated in 20th century corporate America, and thus among 
the most important in the development of 20th century accounting 
and financial management thought. 
A January 1996 article in Scientific American noted the 
hearty timelessness of Donaldson Brown’s then 82-year-old 
return-on-investment (ROI) measure, also known as the DuPont 
formula [“How Much Bang for the Buck?,” 1996]. While it is 
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rare for any financial publication, professional or academic, to 
associate a financial management innovation so directly with a 
single individual, it is even more notable when such a respected 
science publication does so. Today, as well, if one performs 
an ad hoc ‘Google’ search under the name Donaldson Brown 
(in combination with DuPont/GM/General Motors) it yields 
over one million hits, affirming a broad awareness of Brown’s 
pioneering, and if not legendary, role in industrial financial 
management. Although it was at DuPont that Brown developed 
many of his concepts, it was at General Motors Corporation 
(GM) where he was able to put them to work. Brown’s title was 
officially that of chief financial officer, but he was also essential-
ly what is known today as the chief information officer at both 
companies—a role that effectively supported GM’s decentraliza-
tion. This paper explores the many contributions of Donaldson 
Brown to the practice of accounting within corporate financial 
management. 
While the contemporary acknowledgement of ROI seems 
widespread and established, there are circumstances that war-
rant revisiting Donaldson Brown today. First, accounting history 
has not provided a seminal study of Brown’s work to comple-
ment the 1996 Scientific American recognition, which arguably 
reflected momentum from earlier studies such as those by Chan-
dler and Salsbury [1971], Johnson [1978], Johnson and Kaplan 
[1987] and Johnson [1991]. Second, contemporary reinterpreta-
tion should be stimulated by the new and thoughtful works by 
business historians such as Freeland [1996; 2001] and Leven-
stein [1998] as well as added works that provide background 
about previous research, such as McDonald’s [2002] memoir 
of his ghost writing assignment for Alfred Sloan’s My Years 
with General Motors [1964]. This latter volume clearly, albeit 
indirectly, established that the management of General Motors 
was highly sensitive to both in fact and in appearance activities 
that might abet the Federal Government’s interests in curbing 
the largest corporation in the world. Thus all the more reason 
that systems of governance and control, the legacies of Brown 
and his colleagues, are today viewed as important in a world 
where corporate governance has become a watchword. Further, 
Freeland’s [2001] interpretation of governance change through 
several decades at General Motors affords fertile ground for 
reconsideration of the importance of ROI and accounting and 
financial control processes initiated by Donaldson Brown’s ‘Eu-
reka’ in l914 [Miranti, 1999]. 
Brown has yet to achieve singular recognition, such as in-
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duction into the Accounting Hall of Fame, whereas comparable 
financial theorists of his era, such as Charles Ezra Sprague, who 
rationalized and popularized the proprietary basic accounting 
equation (A=L+P) in a series of articles published in the late 19th 
century entitled “The Algebra of Accounts,” have been memori-
alized [1880 and 1908].
Brown has gained notoriety and recognition, but within 
limitations. There is little lasting literature as to the importance 
of his work. Now, recent research affords a new opportunity to 
reacquaint the financial community with Brown’s contributions, 
while updating the assessment of Brown’s contributions.
 It is a premise of this paper that Brown’s “Eureka,” i.e., the 
ROI formulation (R=TxP) or “Rate of Return on Capital Equals 
Rate of Turnover of Invested Capital times Percentage of Profit 
on Sales”, was and remains of essential significance, comparable 
to Sprague’s aforementioned contribution in the development 
of accounting thought, particularly from the view of financial 
management of 20th Century US corporations. This is illustrated 
in Exhibit I and will be discussed in detail later. Further, ROI 
was not Brown’s only contribution to financial management, as 
information provided below will explain his ideas on a dealer 
reporting system, flexible budgeting, and price setting. 
This paper is organized as follows. First a brief profile of 
Brown’s upbringing, education, and life are provided. Then in 
Brown’s own words, the formulation of ROI processes at Du-
Pont is described and tracked through the applications at both 
DuPont and General Motors. Next, several passages explore the 
origins of Brown’s thinking and his early writings on a broader 
scale, offering evidence from published and other primary 
sources as to the significance of ROI as well as a number of oth-
er financial management practices that relate to Brown. The pa-
per concludes with contemporary considerations about impact 
and continuing usefulness of the ROI method, including a 21st 
century ROI application as part of Value-Based Measurement 
(VBM). The concluding comments identify potential research 
opportunities and affirm that Brown merits recognition as an 
important historical figure in the accounting discipline. 
AN OUTLINE OF BROWN’S LIFE
Frank Donaldson Brown was born in Baltimore on Febru-
ary 1, 1885, the son of J. Willcox Brown and Ellen Turner Mac-
farland. A twin sister died in infancy. He had ten older brothers 
and sisters, and a younger brother [Brown, 1977, p. 7]. His 
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family was descended from a Scotch-Irish family that had immi-
grated to Virginia from New Jersey in the 1700s. His father had 
grown up in a wealthy family and had held the rank of Colonel 
in the Confederate Army. As a boy, Donaldson Brown spent his 
summers at his maternal grandmother’s plantation near Green-
brier, West Virginia [Brown, 1977, p. 13]. He was a precocious 
youth, winning first prize at the age of 13 in a General Electric 
contest to identify a young person who could invent a new appli-
cation of the new energy form—electricity. He invented a device 
that could distinguish the coins dropped into a slot.
Brown entered Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI) in 1898 
at the age of 13, graduating four years later with a degree in 
electrical engineering. Today, the student union at VPI is named 
for him. He undertook postgraduate work briefly at Cornell, but 
did not graduate due to the death of his father. 
Brown began his career in 1903 with the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, but soon moved to the Sprague Electric Company, a 
subsidiary of General Electric. He stayed with that company un-
til 1907 when he went into business for himself in a coal-moving 
company. Following a short stint in that business, he went to 
work in 1909 as a salesman of explosives for the DuPont Com-
pany. In 1912, DuPont general manager, Hamilton Barksdale, a 
first cousin who was married to a duPont,1 recognized Brown’s 
administrative abilities and asked him to join the general office 
staff [Brown, 1977, p. 25]. Later, in June 1916, Brown married 
Barksdale’s daughter, Greta duPont Barksdale, which gave him a 
kinship that some considered necessary for advancement at Du-
Pont. He was elected to the DuPont board of directors in 1918 
and remained thereon until his death 47 years later. He served 
on the DuPont board’s Finance Committee for 45 years. He died 
on October 2, 1965, at the age of 80 [“Obituaries,” 1965]. In his 
later years, he served on various boards including service as a 
trustee of Johns Hopkins University. 
Brown apparently was well compensated at DuPont if a 
1921 newspaper article is any indication. An April 26, 1921, 
article in the New York Evening Post noted that Brown’s 40-
room home in Irvington-on-Hudson had burned. Fortunately, 
the servants were able to carry the children to safety. The home 
was described as one of the largest in the area. The damage to 
the home was estimated at $60,000 to $75,000 [“Donaldson…, 
1921]. The move to GM enhanced Brown’s earnings even more; 
1 Note that the name of the DuPont company is capitalized, but the surnames 
of the founding family members do not have an initial capitalization.
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by the 1930s, he was one of the highest paid employees in 
America. In 1934, he earned $134,521, when the GM president 
Alfred Sloan made $201,693. The highest paid individuals in 
America that year were Thomas Watson of IBM ($364,432) and 
movie star Will Rogers ($324,314). A 1936 study reported that 
he owned nearly a quarter of a million shares of GM stock [“Big 
Share Holdings…, 1936] and his salary was $353,732 [“G.M. 
Slashes…,” 1938]. In the 1940s, the U. S. Treasury Department, 
which at that time reported the income of all taxpayers who 
earned over $75,000 annually, reported that Brown was the 
19th highest paid person in America with a salary of $232,571 
[“Show World…, 1945]. Note that this amount is his salary; it 
does not include dividends. Many of those above him on the 
list were Hollywood personalities such as Darryl F. Zanuck, Ray 
Milland, and William Bendix. By 1957, Brown was listed as one 
of the 76 wealthiest Americans with assets of over $75 million; 
this put him ahead of such names as Henry Ford II and just 
below John D. Rockefeller III and the other third generation 
Rockefellers [“List of 76…, 1957]. In summary, Brown was well 
compensated for his contributions to the company. 
Donaldson Brown at DuPont
Corporation c. 1920
(Source: http://heritage.dupont.com)
Donaldson Brown c. 1955
(Source: Some Reminiscences of an 
Industrialist, 1977))
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RECOUNTING THE DISCOVERY—BROWN’S 1914 
“EUREKA!”
In 1914, Brown was asked for a report on the performance 
of several operating departments at DuPont. It was at this point 
that he developed the procedure now known as the DuPont for-
mula. Brown recounted the event in his memoirs as follows:
“An event occurred in l914 which proved to be the turn-
ing point of my business career. The circumstances 
which led up to it were accidental, and I have often 
wondered what might have been my fate and fortune 
in industrial management if I had not, that summer, hit 
upon the mathematical equation (R=T x P)…. 
Mr. Barksdale was in bad health and was forced to take 
extended time off, which he spent with his family in 
Westport, New York. During a period of such absence 
from the office, the President of the company, Coleman 
duPont called for a study and report on the perfor-
mance and accomplishments of the several operating 
departments. I undertook the job. …
The basis of my report gauging the performance of the 
various operating departments was a simple mathemati-
cal formula: R = T x P. The factor R represented the rate 
of return on capital invested, which is a final and funda-
mental measure of industrial efficiency in terms of man-
agement’s primary responsibility. The T stood for the 
rate of turnover of invested capital, and P for the per-
centage of profit on sales. On the investment side T was 
broken down into components, embracing plant and 
other fixed investment items, as well as amounts tied 
up in working capital in various categories such as raw 
materials, work in process, finished product, accounts 
receivable and required operating cash balances. …
A chart room was set up where these statistical data 
pertaining to each segment of the company’s opera-
tions were displayed. Meetings were held regularly with 
department heads, and extended discussions were held 
regarding the possibility of improving specific cost and 
expense items, in relation to the end-result of return on 
invested capital.” [Brown, 1977, pp. 26-27]
According to Brown’s posthumously published memoirs, 
that chart room was still in existence forty years later [Brown, 
1977, p. 27]. A similar room was established at General Motors 
when Brown moved to Detroit.
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Brown’s published memoirs are introduced by Ernest Dale 
of the Wharton School who puts Brown’s contribution, resulting 
in the chart room, into perspective. 
The charting technique that the DuPont Company uti-
lizes for financial control of its operations constitutes 
one of the best measures of management effectiveness 
ever devised. [Brown, 1977, p. i].
DUPONT AND GENERAL MOTORS
Brown’s career at General Motors began following the du-
Pont family investment in the automaker, with the family gain-
ing a controlling interest by 1921. He became Vice President of 
Finance at GM in that year and Vice Chair of the GM Board in 
l938. He remained an active executive until 1946, and a member 
of the Board and its Financial Policy Committee until l959. 
Alfred Sloan, recalling Brown’s experience at DuPont and 
then GM, notes:
Mr. Brown took upon himself the job of developing a 
method to reveal the desired facts about the several 
activities under the general manager. The method he 
chose emphasized the importance of capital turnover 
as well as profit margin in calculating return on invest-
ment. …
The duPont group, after coming into the corporation 
in l917 had made an effort to apply the principles of 
return on investment in appropriating funds to the op-
erating side of the corporation.
I have described in an earlier chapter how, during the 
expansion of 1919 difficulties arose owing to the loose 
manner in which appropriations were made…. It was in 
the effort to meet these specific emerging problems that 
new methods of financial co-ordination and control 
were developed in General Motors [Sloan, l964, ll7-8].
While he developed the ROI concept at DuPont, it was at 
struggling and troubled General Motors, which was attempting 
to expand in the growing automobile business, that Brown’s 
metric of ROI became an important device for the duPonts to 
exercise control over the capital allocations, and thus establish 
an important governance process. Indeed Pierre duPont insisted 
on some key controls as part of the investment in General Mo-
tors. “The Finance and Executive Committees at General Motors 
and the appropriations procedures must be patterned after 
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those at DuPont.” (emphasis supplied) [Chandler and Salsbury 
1971, 451].
An advantage of Brown’s appropriations technique was that 
it not only calculated return on investment (ROI), it also identi-
fied the elements of that measure. The formulation permitted 
easy viewing of the effects of changes in prices, asset levels, and 
sales volume. As Brown noted in his memoirs:
“This approach resulted in a specific disclosure of 
causes and effects for the return on investment shown 
for each department. Effective control or the lack of 
it, for any item on either side of the equation could be 
identified, thus making possible efforts to improve con-
ditions….. [Brown, l977].
Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. affirms this view as follows: 
The early return-on-investment form, which with some 
modifications is still used in General Motors, was the 
first step in educating our operating personnel in the 
meaning and importance of rate of return as a standard 
of performance. It... laid the foundation for what was 
to be one of General Motors’ most important character-
istics, namely, its effort to achieve open-minded com-
munication and objective consideration of facts [Sloan, 
1964, p. 143].
And Sloan adds:
The divisional return-on-investment reports, ultimately 
based on a uniform accounting system, were constantly 
studied by the top executives. If the indicated results 
were not satisfactory, I or some other general executive 
would confer with the division managers about the cor-
rective measures to be taken. [Sloan, l964, p. 207].
The assessment of satisfactory ROI at GM was seen by 
Brown to be “a return on investment consistent with long-term 
sustainable growth. He clearly recognized that a simplistic 
model of performance measurement, particularly when it is 
used in an executive compensation scheme, could have negative 
long-term effects on the firm – causing an executive whose sal-
ary is tied to ROI to sacrifice long-term prospects for short-term 
profit.” [Garstka and Goetzmann, 1999, p. 10]. 
The importance of return on investment as a long-term 
measure of corporate productivity reflected Brown’s view that 
business owes its existence to its owners and should be expected 
to operate for their benefit. His writings often reiterated the con-
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cept that “there is just one central motive in industrial manage-
ment, i.e., the permanent welfare of the owners of the business” 
[Brown, 1927, p. 5]. Despite the importance of the owners, the 
ROI measure was also used as a standard measure for GM’s 
executive bonus plan. Managers who met their ROI goals were 
rewarded, while those who failed to meet goals “might well find 
themselves looking for work” [Tedlow, 1988, p. 54].
Knowledge of the rate of return on investment was par-
ticularly important at DuPont and GM because these companies 
were among the first to use discounted-cash-flow analysis to 
evaluate the attractiveness of future investment alternatives. By 
combining the rate of return of all corporate components, man-
agement was able to employ the price of capital within the com-
pany. DuPont’s ROI reporting compared all of the company’s 
operations with alternative capital investments. The result was 
a financial management system that “significantly decreased the 
cost of managing complex integrated firms and the cost of dis-
covering new profitable investments within the firm” [Dulman, 
1989, p. 564]. The system:
enabled top management to communicate its perfor-
mance goals to operating managers clearly. Combined 
with a multidivisional structure, it allowed senior ex-
ecutives to maintain centralized control but encouraged 
operating managers to decide how to employ their divi-
sion’s resources most profitably [Dulman, 1989, p. 565]. 
In other words, as the title of a 1927 article by Brown indicated, 
the use of the DuPont formula provided “Centralized Control 
with Decentralized Responsibility” [Brown, 1927]. Kaplan sum-
marized this contribution as follows:
The functionally departmentalized DuPont system is 
the first example of applying local profit measures to 
evaluate the performance of operating departments. It 
was successful in coordinating and rationalizing the 
operations of the large industrial corporations that 
formed in the early 1900s. The basic functional orga-
nization is still used in many worldwide corporations 
today, more than 70 years after its introduction. The 
development of the ROI criterion, applied at a depart-
mental level, seems to be the origin of the profit and 
investment center concept used in most modern corpo-
rations. It is remarkable to note these lasting legacies of 
Pierre duPont and Donaldson Brown on modern indus-
trial enterprises [Kaplan, 1984, p. 398].
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Brown’s complete forumula was displayed in a 1950 American 
Management Association publication as displayed in Exhibit I 
[Davis, 1950].
EXHIBIT I
The Du Pont formula was a major contribution to system-
atic management, but it was only one of many contributions by 
Brown. Over his long career he worked to address a broad range 
of financial management information issues. The following sec-
tions provide a recapitulation of some of the other examples of 
his financial management thought and writings, including those 
related to pricing policy, dealer inventory control, decentralized 
controls, flexible budgeting, forecasting, and planning. 
PRICING POLICY
Brown’s thoughts on pricing policy were based on a stan-
dard factory volume designed to produce an average rate of 
return of acceptable level over a period that included both bad 
and good years. This standard volume was defined as 80% of 
capacity. As applied, this policy was essentially a form of what is 
TURNOVER
EARNINGS
AS % OF SALES
SALES
TOTAL
INVESTMENT
EARNINGS
SALES
SALES
COST OF SALES
WORKING
CAPITAL*
PERMANENT
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INVENTORIES
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CASH
MILL COST
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EXPENSE
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now known as target pricing. Writing in 1924, Brown described 
a ‘theory’ of pricing supporting this policy. 
“…General Motors theory of pricing has a definite ob-
jective: to gain, over a protracted period of time, a mar-
gin of profit representing the highest attainable return 
commensurate with capital turnover and wholesome 
expansion, with adequate regard to the economic con-
sequences of fluctuating volume.” [Brown, February, 
l924]. 
Principles to guide the pricing of automobiles were ad-
opted in the early 1920s and summarized in a series of articles 
published by Brown in 1924 in the journal Management and 
Administration. A fundamental concept of the GM pricing policy 
was the establishment of a standard volume that would take 
cyclical fluctuations into account. Without such a standard vol-
ume, management might consider raising prices in slow years 
to maintain a normal profit margin. But, to raise prices during a 
recession would be counter productive, so the GM policy was to 
normalize returns over a long period of time that included both 
seasonal and cyclical changes in volume. The resulting prices 
tended to lessen the problem of deep troughs and raised the 
peaks in the course of the business cycle. During the depression 
following 1929, this pricing principle was adhered to in spite of 
subnormal profits. Still, the company remained profitable--even 
though at a lower level.
The pricing strategy began with a base price, which was 
a ratio to factory cost and included a rate of return on capital 
employed. That base was then modified by a number of factors, 
including nature of the business and its stage of development, 
degree of difficulty in meeting a continued growth in demand, 
productivity of capital in the industry, susceptibility of demand 
to price variation (elasticity), availability and cost of capital, 
advantages over competition, level of demand, and goodwill in 
the business [Brown, March 1924, p. 286; Brown, April 1924, p. 
417].
INVENTORY AND DECENTRALIZED CONTROLS
Brown’s recommendations to identify hidden inventory (i.e., 
in the hands of dealers) led to a plan to get inventory reports 
from dealers every ten days. The entire industry soon adopted 
this reporting schedule. Brown also was responsible for a con-
cept at General Motors known as “decentralized operations and 
coordinated control.” This meant a uniform system of account-
11
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ing for all auto dealers. He willingly delegated power as far 
down in the decentralized hierarchy as possible. Because each 
division’s accounting system was uniform with all other divi-
sions, the data facilitated comparisons among dealers; thus, GM 
was in a better position to evaluate its dealer system than was 
Ford, which often undercut its own organization by packing too 
many dealers into a particular market region [Clarke, 1996, p. 
189].
Prior to 1921, inventories had gotten out of control at many 
of GM’s divisions--the result being heavy borrowing to finance 
unneeded inventories. One of the causes of the inventory prob-
lems was the hazard of basing commitments on inaccurate fore-
casts and of losses from price changes or obsolescence [Brown, 
1977, p. 47]. The 1921 imposition of a budgeting system was the 
first step toward reducing those inventories. Brown’s later 1924 
requirement that dealers report inventories every ten days was a 
step toward eliminating inaccurate forecasts of future sales. The 
purpose of the reports was to learn whether inventories were 
accumulating on dealer lots [O’Brien, 1989, p. 80]. The policy 
of requiring dealers to submit reports at 10-day intervals was a 
lasting one, eventually adopted by all firms in the automobile 
industry [Brown, 1977, p. 53]. Using these periodic reports 
(initially from 20,000 dealers), management was able to base 
production schedules and material commitments on the trend 
of retail sales. The result was that Brown was able to use a cen-
tralized budgeting system to control decentralized operations. 
Every division made its own production decisions, but Brown’s 
budget and accounting system were policy tools that guaranteed 
goal congruence throughout the decentralized structure.
The aforementioned dealer reports were also used by Brown 
to gauge how profitable sales were for retailers. For example, 
sales made at little or no profit may indicate a tightening mar-
ket; consequently, production might be curtailed even though 
sales trends, in units, were holding steady. Brown stated:
In the past, overproduction has been defined as a main-
tenance of production out of proportion to the retail 
sales rate. In the future we must define overproduction 
as being that quantity of cars in excess of the produc-
tion that would be required to insure a proper stability 
and provide equitable profits to both the manufacturer 
and his dealer organization [Brown, 1930, p. 354-355].
Brown did not personally dictate to division managers when the 
use of the dollar-volume figures should overrule the basic budget 
12
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figures, but he did discuss the implications with division manag-
ers and urged them to consider the implications of forced sales 
on the near-term market. Brown was a believer in the power of 
knowledge: “As a fundamental requisite in the work of coordina-
tion, it should be remembered that the bringing of men’s minds 
together in connection with a given problem can always be 
greatly facilitated through a presentation of facts” [Brown, 1927, 
p. 12]. 
Business historian Alfred Chandler identified not only de-
centralized structure, but also sophisticated financial manage-
ment systems as essential to the multidivisional organization 
[Chandler, 1962]. Basically, General Motors had a decentralized 
structure before the arrival of Donaldson Brown, but it was not 
effective. According to Johnson: 
Remarkably alert to the importance of management ac-
counting to GM’s new structure was a former DuPont 
executive, Donaldson Brown. Brown, the chief archi-
tect of the accounting procedures introduced at GM, 
applied to GM the DuPont Company’s advanced and 
sophisticated financial control techniques. These tech-
niques made possible what GM officials described as 
“centralized control with decentralized responsibility;” 
they enabled GM’s top management to control the per-
formance of each division without becoming involved 
in the general manager’s administration of his division-
al operation [Johnson, 1978, p. 493].
Johnson concluded his praise for Brown with the following 
comments about GM’s accounting system and its contribution to 
the success of decentralization.
Year in and year out, despite many radical fluctuations 
in the national demand for automobiles, GM recorded a 
positive return on investment. During the post-1929 de-
pression it was one of very few major U. S. corporations 
that did not register losses. Undoubtedly one important 
cause of GM’s success in dealing with the problem of 
fluctuating annual demand was Donaldson Brown’s ac-
counting system [Johnson, 1978, p. 510]. 
Brown’s awareness of and obsession with the power of 
information was somewhat unusual for his time; his ideas are 
more typical of today’s chief information officers. His broad con-
ception of GM’s information needs and an information network 
were yet other contributions that would impact generations to 
come. 
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Despite the success of his approaches, in 1953, in a letter 
to Sloan, Brown lamented that his greatest fear was that future 
General Motors managers might abandon his decentralization 
ideas [Brown, 1977, p. iv]. 
 
FLEXIBLE BUDGETING: FORECASTING AND PLANNING
Flexible budgeting at GM was also one of Brown’s innova-
tions. Many of Brown’s innovations had a major impact not 
only on DuPont and General Motors, but on American Industry 
as a whole. Such was not the case, however, with his invention 
of flexible budgeting. The concept of business budgeting was 
unknown before the 1920s. The first important book on business 
budgeting by J. O. McKinsey, founder of the consulting firm and 
a faculty member at the University of Chicago, appeared in 1922 
[McKinsey]. His volume, however, included nothing on flexible 
budgeting. One general history of accounting attributes the de-
velopment of flexible budgeting to Westinghouse Corporation 
in 1928, and states that the Westinghouse method was widely 
imitated in the 1930s [Chatfield, 1977, p. 179]. However, Brown 
had implemented a flexible budgeting system at General Motors 
at least as early as 1923. Brown described his system in a series 
of three articles on GM’s pricing and budgeting procedures pub-
lished in early 1924. In fact, the budgets shown in the articles 
depict standard costs at each of four volume levels. For some 
reason, readers seemed to focus on the pricing aspects of the ar-
ticles and not on budgeting. Brown did not call his system “flex-
ible budgeting,” but that is what it was. His phraseology was 
“analysis of commercial expenses at various volumes” [Brown, 
1924a; 1924b]. Perhaps in the future, researchers will address 
this question, namely whether Westinghouse or other compa-
nies who were early adopters were influenced by Brown and his 
writings. In addition to his article publications, Brown shared 
his thoughts on budgeting in the foreword to a 1928 book by 
Fred W. Shibley, entitled The New Way to Net Profits. Although 
it did not use the term, the Shibley book did refer to a flexible 
budget [pages 143-144], with variable costs being calculated as a 
percentage of sales. Terminology mirrored that in Brown’s 1924 
article. It was pointed out that such a budget emphasized the 
fact that profits increased substantially when sales were greater 
than shown in the master budget. Brown, too, referred to the 
concept without going into detail with the following words: 
Budgetary control is an apt phrase except that it is 
likely to imply a rigidity that must be guarded against. 
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Flexibility is a prime requisite so that there may be a 
quick response, and thus the possibility of adjustment 
throughout the system to the requirements of changes 
of situation that are inevitable. The focal point of the 
system is the sales outlet. The flow at this point must be 
gauged, and every other activity must be coordinated 
with it [Brown, 1928b, p. viii].
Brown introduced a budgeting system at GM shortly after 
moving to that firm in 1921. Sales forecasts were used to plan 
production and acquisition of production resources. Divisions 
were required to submit monthly forecasts of production sched-
ules four months ahead. Such planning required forecasts of 
sales to which production was tied. Procurement of materials 
could not deviate from the needs specified in the forecast. A 
reading of Brown’s explanation of the GM system gives one a 
feeling of something closely akin to a modern Materials Re-
quirement Planning (MRP) system [Brown, 1928a, p. 9]. Actu-
ally, Brown’s budgeting innovations had begun at DuPont, where 
he brought into the staff a full-time political economist to pro-
vide consultation and advice on forward trends of the national 
economy that might affect demand for the company’s products 
[Brown, 1977, p. 28]. The economist later moved to GM at the 
request of Brown. Use of such planners became common prac-
tice among large companies.
Brown’s budgeting work at DuPont was the likely source 
of his process implementations at GM, but the objectives of 
budgeting were different at the two companies. At DuPont, 
budgeting was designed to control cash and major financing re-
quirements, but at GM the objective was oriented more toward 
controlling sales and costs, particularly given the unpredictable 
changes that often occurred with respect to automotive demand. 
Thus, Brown modified the DuPont budgeting procedures to 
serve another purpose, i.e., production planning versus cash 
planning. Brown recognized that budgeting could be used for 
multiple purposes long before most managers realized budget-
ing could serve any purpose. At DuPont, Brown’s forecasting ob-
jective had been balance-sheet oriented; at GM the objective was 
income-statement oriented. In fact, his writings make it clear 
that forecasts were designed to reduce the impact on income of 
changes in the business cycle. 
Perhaps Brown’s budgeting thought can best be summed 
up in his own words published in a 1928 monograph published 
by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce: “Forecasting and planning 
is the essence of modern-day business management” [Brown, 
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1928a, p. 3].
CONTEMPORARY CONSIDERATIONS
Writing in l999, Professor David Hounshell of Carnegie Mel-
lon University made an important accounting history observa-
tion in a footnote to his paper “Assets, Organizations, Strategies, 
and Traditions: Organizational Capabilities and Constraints in 
the Remaking of the Ford Motor Company, l946-62.” His study 
relates the post WWII transition of Ford Motor Company from a 
Unitary centralized form of family controlled business that was 
identified with Henry Ford’s autocratic management style to a 
Multi-division decentralized form that was the signature form of 
GM under Sloan and Brown. 
 In l922, Henry Ford had observed: “That which one has 
to fight hardest against in bringing together a large number of 
people to do work is excess organization and consequent red 
tape. To my mind there is no bent of mind more dangerous than 
that which is sometimes described as the ‘genius for organiza-
tion’” [Ford 1922]. Ford’s own “genius” was to run the business 
according to his experience and whim. He eventually bought out 
all outside owners to avoid competing proprietary interests. And 
he took unilateral and drastic steps such as closing down the 
company for a year to allow for complete rebuilding of Ford’s 
production facilities. Such unprecedented action was consistent 
with his unilateral style and authority. 
What Hounshell helps accounting historians understand is 
how it came to be that a dramatic shift from the Unitary form 
to the Multi-division form could be accomplished in Ford Mo-
tor Company. To put this into perspective, H. Thomas Johnson, 
points out that “Financial management information arose 
before World War I primarily to simulate market prices that dis-
appeared when companies internalized … management transac-
tions….” [Johnson 1991]. Thus, as larger complex units sought 
a consistent process of creating internal information for control 
purposes, financial management systems were required, since 
market prices were not available within large organizations to 
inform decision makers.
How did this impact Ford after WWII? The decision facing 
Ford in the late l940s, as noted by Hounshell, was the need to 
depart from the single geographic production facility that fit the 
Unitary model of Ford, wherein all operations were conducted 
at one massive plant in Michigan. The proposal in 1946 to build 
an Engine Plant near Cleveland versus expanding the existing 
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home plant gave rise to the issue of how, in a former Unitary 
operation, internal financial information could be established to 
support what would become a decentralized multi-geographic 
entity, a completely new experience for Ford. 
The resolution to their development of a financial man-
agement information system was found in the mental habits 
or ‘software’ of the new team of managers employed by the 
Ford family to run the post WWII business. Leading the team, 
eventually as board chairman was Ernest Breech, a former 
GM vice president who had been an assistant to Donaldson 
Brown. Breech had been indoctrinated in the GM way of doing 
things. At the same time, Henry Ford II brought in a group of 
lower-level managers who came to be known as the “Whiz Kids.” 
Leading this group of Whiz Kids was Robert McNamara, who 
would later become the first non-family member to hold the title 
of President of Ford Motor Company and would later become 
the U. S. Secretary of Defense during the Viet Nam War. As a 
student of Professors Robert Anthony and Ross Walker at the 
Harvard Business School, McNamara had learned Donaldson 
Brown’s ROI formulation and as a consultant, presumably, had 
experience applying it.2 By employing Brown’s metric and bring-
ing into the top levels of Ford management other executives 
from GM who were familiar with the ROI approach to financial 
management, Ford became sufficiently likeminded to operate as 
a decentralized operation. 
Hounshell emphasized how profoundly McNamara had 
been influenced by Brown via Anthony.
He had studied and taught business management at 
Harvard Business School, where he had become a 
disciple of Robert Anthony, a professor of accounting 
whose philosophy was that accounting should provide 
the principal means of control and decision making in 
the corporation. Under Anthony, McNamara had mas-
tered the case on return-on-investment calculations and 
decision criteria that Donaldson Brown had developed 
2 Hounshell [1999, p. 203], based on a 1994 interview with McNamara, asserts 
that Anthony was the source of McNamara’s knowledge of GM’s techniques. 
Alternatively, Zeff [2008, p. 180; Anthony, 1989, p. 2], based on a 2007 interview 
with McNamara, argues that Walker was the source of the knowledge about GM. 
Shapley [1993, p. 24], in her biography of McNamara, simply states that Walker 
was the instructor who taught much of the material. Since both Anthony and 
McNamara had Walker as a professor, both may have learned the concepts from 
Walker, but then McNamara may have gained additional insight from Anthony 
when the two later shared an office together from 1940 to 1942.
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at the DuPont Company. 
 Then, in a footnote, Hounshell continues: 
In an interview with me in Washington DC, 7 Septem-
ber 1994, Robert McNamara was still able to recite 
chapter and verse of the principal aspects of Donaldson 
Brown’s ROI formulation [Hounshell 1999, p.203].
There are other recent demonstrations of the durable and 
resilient attractiveness of the DuPont formula as well, includ-
ing both appreciative and critical comments made in the late 
l990s. Robin Blumenthal, writing in CFO magazine in January 
1998, noted that some critics felt that the DuPont model falls 
short because it is not an effective tool for predicting the future 
or for tracking costs. The model also lacks the means to include 
increasingly prominent intangible assets in its return calcula-
tions, an issue in the dot.com era of the late l990s. However, one 
consultant had adapted a cash flow metric to ROI providing for 
a Cash Flow Return on Investment, or CFROI, to address such 
concerns. With competing measures available, such as EVA 
(Economic Value Added), which has gained recognition and 
popularity in recent years, ROI now may be seen as one among 
many options, versus having been the principal option in the 
past [Blumenthal, 1998, p. 61].
Assessing the increasing number of metrics available for 
today’s Value-Based Management (VBM) approaches, research 
provides findings that indicate that “standard financial ratio 
analysis as expressed in the DuPont formulation are signifi-
cantly related to market performance metrics” and therefore 
meaningful to implementing VBM. For example, Weaver and 
Weston conclude that traditional (ROI) and alternative methods 
such as Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Economic Value (EV) or 
Economic Value Added (EVA) and Return to Shareholders (RTS-
capital gains plus dividends), each have particular merits that 
should be assessed in accordance with a firm’s strategic objec-
tives. Furthermore, the researchers provide a clinical analysis 
centered on Hershey Foods Corporation. Their ROI schematic 
for Hershey Foods is provided in a related paper “Implement-
ing Value Based Management” [Weaver and Weston, June 3, 
2003a]. It employs elements that compare fully to the American 
Management Association l950 monograph construction of the 
DuPont ROI formulation. 
 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND CONCLUSION
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This paper has considered the power of an individual and 
his ideas over time by reviewing the role of F. Donaldson Brown, 
whose ROI formulation, development of flexible budgeting, 
and other contributions to financial management information 
represent a fundamental component of financial literature. The 
business historian Hounshell put Brown’s ROI innovation in 
perspective in the following terms:
The DuPont innovation of ROI calculations represents 
one of the most significant turning points in the history 
of modern accounting and management. …it allowed 
for the first time the integration of financial account-
ing, capital accounting, and cost accounting…. I call 
attention to Brown’s ROI formula not only because of 
its importance but because it was merely one analyti-
cal method developed at DuPont to guide its executives 
in making decisions about the allocation of assets. 
Brown’s work was done in the context of DuPont’s bold 
program of diversification, which over little more than 
a decade moved the company from being predomi-
nantly an explosives manufacturer to becoming a diver-
sified chemical giant. The company’s executives needed 
objective methods to guide their resource allocation 
decisions. Would DuPont realize a greater return by 
investing in this business rather than that one? Should 
executives fund the expansion of this plant rather than 
that one? Brown’s methods helped guide these execu-
tives, and it also allowed them to measure the perfor-
mance of existing DuPont businesses [Hounshell, 1998, 
p. 8].
The practices initiated and or implemented by Donaldson 
Brown enabled DuPont and General Motors to cope with the 
challenges of large companies seeking to balance centralized 
vs. decentralized decision making. Brown’s ideas were made 
known through his writings, publications, and speeches, and 
ultimately by incorporation in textbooks, classrooms, and aca-
demic literature. Trade organizations and financial publications, 
for decades up to the present, have disseminated ROI materials. 
Furthermore, his disciples also helped in spreading his influence 
far beyond GM and DuPont. 
Nevertheless, there has been no attempt to collect and pub-
lish Brown’s papers in a fashion consistent with other major 
contributors to the financial discipline. Further, there has been 
no substantive biographical study that reaches beyond the mere 
outline of his personality and his activities, which might help 
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people to understand more about how Brown’s mind worked. 
For example, was this ‘thinker upper’ a creative genius, or a 
simulator and collaborator? The purported Donaldson Brown 
archives at the Hagley Museum and Library in Delaware could 
offer support to scholars interested in deeper study and exami-
nation of Brown.
The 1957 U.S. Supreme Court edict ruling that DuPont’s 
controlling interest in GM had resulted in restraint of trade 
led to E. I. du Pont de Nemours divesting itself of GM stock 
and removing its representatives from GM’s board and govern-
ing committees [Freeland 2001, p. 254]. However the habitual, 
long standing relationships among leaders of the two corpora-
tions, as discoverable under social network analysis, suggests 
a method and an area of inquiry that accounting and business 
historians alike could find important in identifying informal net-
works that reveal relationships among major corporate leaders. 
Potential research opportunities include reviewing and explicat-
ing Brown’s social and professional networks using diagram 
analysis. Such a diagram would display the names that appear 
commonly on the same printed page with Brown’s name using 
selected publications that have studied the super rich, DuPont 
and GM, as well as the most financially powerful individuals in 
the nation from a critical perspective.
Although many of Brown’s contacts bear the surname of 
duPont, there are also many who have automotive backgrounds, 
such as Alfred P. Sloan, Walter P. Chrysler, and Charles F. Ket-
tering (the founder of Delco and director of research at GM for 
27 years). Brown’s corporate network included, besides auto 
companies, Westinghouse Corporation, U. S. Steel, and General 
Electric. Beyond social networks, it would seem of interest to 
attempt to employ this mapping process with regard to the fi-
nancial management literature or to similar materials involving 
Brown’s contributions to control and governance to establish a 
perspective on Brown’ relationships and influence in corporate 
administration. This would seem to have potential to improve 
the understanding of his conceptual and personal relationships 
at both DuPont and General Motors. Actually, the companies 
themselves should be lauded for allowing Brown the opportu-
nity to be recognized—something that probably would not have 
occurred had he worked for Ford instead of GM. O’Brien sug-
gested as follows:
The detailed accounts in the contemporary business 
and management literature of the formulation and 
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implementation of production and inventory control 
systems that are available for General Motors are not 
available for Ford. This is because Henry Ford was re-
luctant to allow any member of his organization, other 
than himself, to receive publicity. Donaldson Brown, for 
instance, never would have survived at Ford if he had 
been receiving the sort of publicity and acclaim that he 
did during the 1920s while at GM [O’Brien, 1989, p. 83].
Today, ROI continues to be employed in the writings of 
established and promising authors. The example of ROI as a 
particular traditional application of Value-Based-Management 
suggests that the formulation continues to add value to industri-
al financial management. Similarly, Brown’s thoughts on flexible 
budgeting form the basis for that concept today. 
In summary, as Ernest Dale indicated, Donaldson Brown 
was GM’s original “thinker-upper” [Brown, 1977, p. vii]. The 
explication of Donaldson Brown’s contributions to the develop-
ment of accounting thought and practice in this paper support 
that he warrants formal recognition such as has been made to 
peers acknowledged for their achievements and contributions to 
the discipline. Those trusted with bestowing such recognitions, 
in particular the nominators of the Accounting Hall of Fame, 
are encouraged to acknowledge Brown and rectify a long stand-
ing oversight. Thoughtful innovation and adaptation on the part 
of the nominators seems in order, and if GM’s “thinker upper” 
were available to consult with us today, he might well agree. 
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